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Abstract
The development of methodologies for the design of dis-
tributed protocols is essential to reducing the complexity
and difficulty of creating distributed systems, as well as
for maturing the field. This paper presents a composition
methodology for designing a range of proactive distributed
protocols, with applicability to large-scale distributed sys-
tems in both the Internet (e.g., peer to peer systems) and
wireless sensor networks. The methodology consists of sev-
eral basic building blocks and different composition tech-
niques which can be used to combine the blocks into solu-
tions for distributed computing problems. The compositions
preserve properties of the original components (reliability,
scalability, liveness). Next, we describe a simple specifica-
tion language called “Proactive Protocol Composition Lan-
guage (PPCL)” which can be used to specify and compose
existing source (C language) code of building block imple-
mentations in order to automate the above design method-
ology. We discuss how the methodology and the toolkit gen-
erated by PPCL are (i) retroactive, i.e., can generate pro-
tocols already existing in literature, and (ii) progressive,
i.e., can generate new protocols. For an important dis-
tributed computing problem (membership management in
large groups), we give experimental data to compare (i) a
generated protocols with a hand-written protocol, and (ii)
an existing protocol with an augmentation realized through
PPCL.
1 Introduction
The growth and success of networked technologies such
as the Internet continue to depend on efficient scalable and
reliable distributed protocols running within. These proto-
cols range from distributed middleware to network routing.
While the properties and behavior of many distributed pro-
tocols is well understood, the actual act of designing a pro-
tocol remains a challenge, and is still considered by many
to be an art. As of today, there are very few practical frame-
works for systematically designing, and generating code for,
distributed protocols.
Over the past few years, we have designed several prob-
abilistic protocols for large-scale distributed systems, e.g.,
[5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Recently however, we have discov-
ered a surprisingly simple, clean, yet powerful, composition
methodology that underlies the design of an entire set of
proactive protocols, including many of the protocols cited
above. In this paper, we first describe this design method-
ology. This description is informal, owing to the design-
pattern like nature of the methodology.
Secondly, we detail how a designer can use this method-
ology on existing source code in order to automatically gen-
erate code for new protocols. Towards this end, we present
a new high level language called PPCL. The use of PPCL
is not in writing the actual code for the components (which
can be implemented independently in a C-like language),
but instead to specify the components and compositions. It
enables a designer to use the composition methodology on
existing C code to automatically generate deployable code
for new protocols. In effect, PPCL is an actual implemen-
tation of the above methodology (only). Finally, we present
experimental results that study how the compositions pre-
serve scalability and reliability of components, without too
much of an increase in code complexity.
Several fields of engineering have attained maturity
through the development of design methodologies. This in-
cludes code synthesis engines for VLSI development [1],
design patterns for software engineering [7], etc. We be-
lieve that similar approaches may be needed to ensure the
longevity of distributed protocols designed by the research
community.
The composition methodology presented in this paper
originated from a retrospective examination of probabilistic
protocols that we developed for large-scale distributed sys-
tems [5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. These protocols (which included
leader election, multicast, aggregation, resource discovery,
membership, etc.) can be generated using seven basic build-
ing blocks, each of which is either a protocol or a strategy,
and by using three simple composition rules. In this paper,
we describe an extended methodology with a larger number
of building blocks and composition rules, powerful enough
to generate protocols for Internet-based distributed systems
as well as wireless ad-hoc/sensor networks. We also argue
why the compositions preserve the scalability and reliability
properties of the original components.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section of
the paper summarizes existing composition efforts. A ret-
rospective case study is covered in Section 3 to motivate the
methodology. Section 4 explains the details of the method-
ology. In Section 5 discusses how properties are inherited
through composition. The Proactive Protocol Composition
Language is presented in Section 6, and further examples
of the use of the extended methodology are in Section 7.
Finally the implementation is evaluated in Section 8.
2 Related Work
A notion of composition of probabilistic I/O automata
for distributed systems has been studied in the past by Lynch
[20] and Wu et al [28]. The authors defined I/O automata
with probabilistic state transitions and specified how these
automata can be composed. In comparison, our study of
probabilistic protocol composition is geared towards de-
signing protocols for large-scale distributed systems, where
the scalability and reliability are primary concerns.
Stack-based communication architectures such as the
Horus [26] and Ensemble systems [19] are designed to al-
low network protocol layers to be stacked, with the glue
between layers being a standard function call interface set.
This helps to provide different notions of reliability, mes-
sage ordering, etc., to the end application. Our protocol
composition methodology is aimed at enhancing scalability
and reliability properties of distributed protocols rather than
merely providing richer properties to the application.
X-kernel [16] and Cactus [27] allow composition of net-
work protocols in the kernel level. In x-kernel, protocol
blocks interact with one another via message passing to cre-
ate new protocols which extend the functionality of the ker-
nel. Each protocol piece exports a set of function calls as
a standard interface. Configurations of the kernel are spec-
ified using a textual specification language or a graph. The
Cactus system allows more fine grained composition blocks
than x-kernel. We target the set of protocols that exist above
the kernel, typically in the middleware. Our compositions
are done without interface composition in order to allow
more flexibility.
[23] presents a methodology for combing proactive and
reactive protocols for routing in ad-hoc wireless networks.
Their methodology does not attempt to address protocol de-
sign in general, but rather focuses on the specific scenario
of routing in ad-hoc networks. Their framework is a good
example of one of our compositions, pairing.
Several toolkits are available for component-based soft-
ware development and optimization, e.g., Knit [24]. Com-
ponents have been used for designing software for routers
(Click system) and operating systems (e.g., Scout). Object-
oriented programming languages such as C++ and Java
allow component-based program development. Software
components can also be glued together through higher-level
scripting languages (e.g., Python, VB, Perl) [25] to filter
data streams among different components. In object request
brokerage (ORB) systems (e.g., COM, CORBA, .Net), each
component is an application connected to a communication
network. These are all examples of software composition
and do not address the issue of protocol design.
3 Case Study : A Protocol for Decentralized
Membership Maintenance
In order to motivate discussion about our design method-
ology we present a case study that retrospectively looks at
the design of the SWIM protocol for weakly consistent and
scalable membership maintenance [5],[10]. We chose this
protocol because it solves a well-known distributed comput-
ing problem and provides a simple example of the compo-
sition techniques.
Various distributed algorithms require each member of
the group to maintain a local list of other members in the
group. We call this a membership list (also a view). In
a dynamic group with members constantly joining, leaving
and failing silently (crash-stop), a membership maintenance
protocol keeps these lists up to date. A membership proto-
col has two main components: (a) a failure detector pro-
tocol, and (b) a protocol for membership update dissemi-
nation. In order to generate a membership protocol, any
implementations for the respective components can be fit
into a template, as shown in Figure 1. We begin our dis-
cussion by first describing the building blocks for each of
(a) and (b), and then showing how the building blocks are
composed.
3.1 Building Block: Distributed Ping Protocol
A failure detector protocol runs constantly at each non-
faulty member to detect the failures of other members. It
is required to satisfy a liveness property called Eventual
Strong Completeness (Completeness), i.e., crash-failure of
any group member is detected by all non-faulty members
that knew of the member.
The probabilistic failure detector used in SWIM is called
Distributed Ping [10]. In distributed ping each member pe-
riodically attempts to ping one other member chosen uni-
formly at random. Target nodes are pinged directly first,
{remove,modify(member)}
Function calls
(update dissemination)
(failure detector)
Template 
{add,remove,modify(member)}
failed(member)
Building Blocks
Membership List
Figure 1. Group Membership Template. design of a group
membership protocol is shown, with minimal interfaces for the fail-
ure detector and update dissemination components.
then indirectly if this does not succeed. If the target mem-
ber remains unresponsive it is marked as failed. Further op-
timizations that send out multiple and indirect pings can be
incorporated to reduce the false positive rate. The complete
analysis of Distributed Ping is in [10]. A quick summary
includes the following properties :
• Liveness: Distributed Ping satisfies Eventual Strong
Completeness as described above.
• Analytical: Distributed Ping has a mean time to detect
failure at the first non-faulty member of T ′ · 1
1−e−qf , where
T ′ is protocol period and qf = 1 − pf , with pf being the
probability a random group member is faulty at any given
time. Per-member overhead is defined by a term indepen-
dent of N (the size of the group). This makes Distributed
Ping an asymptotically optimal failure detector (w.r.t. N ).
3.2 Building Block: Uniform Epidemic
The second building block used in SWIM is an infor-
mation dissemination (multicast) protocol, that will be used
to disseminate membership updates (notification of failed
nodes, newly joined nodes, voluntary departures, etc.). The
dissemination protocol used in SWIM is called Uniform
Epidemic and is based on the epidemic (also “gossip”) pro-
tocols in [3, 6]. Once a member has received a multicast,
it periodically (once every gossip period) selects b other
members uniformly at random, and sends them copies of
the multicast (UDP is used). Given a multicast at a sender
member, a Uniform Epidemic disseminates the multicast
message w.h.p. to the group, i.e., for any particular member
in the group, the probability of it receiving the multicast is
known and is very close to 1.
The protocol can be shown to have the following liveness
and analytical properties:
• Liveness: (Eventual Dissemination) If the membership
graph among non-faulty members stays connected after the
multicast dissemination is initiated, and the sender stays
non-faulty, then the multicast is eventually disseminated to
all members that stay non-faulty.
• Analytical: [3] shows that within a number of rounds that
isO(logb(N)), each member receives the multicast with the
probability of 1− 1
Nb
· (1 + o(1)) [2, 6].
3.3 Composition: SWIM Protocol for Weakly-
Consistent Membership Maintenance
Figure 1 shows conceptually how the above described
Uniform Epidemic and Distributed Ping protocols can be
used together to create a membership protocol. We call such
a diagram a template. The template describes how compo-
nents are modularly combined. Notice that any combina-
tion of implementations of a failure detector and a multicast
protocol can be fit into this template.
When the Distributed Ping and Uniform Epidemic proto-
cols are fit into the failure detector and update dissemination
components of Figure 1, the resultant protocol (when opti-
mized) has the make-up of the SWIM algorithm. The opti-
mization in this example is to piggyback outgoing messages
from one protocol on messages from the other to reduce to-
tal message overhead.
From [5, 10] SWIM has the correctness properties of
Eventual Strong Completeness (if a member M i fails, each
Mj that has Mi in its membership list eventually detects the
failure) and Eventual Dissemination of Updates. We note
that liveness and analytical properties are inherited from
the base protocols that make up the SWIM protocol. In
the same way the composition has analytical properties that
are a concatenation of the analytical properties of the Dis-
tributed Ping and the Uniform Epidemic described in Sec-
tions 3.1 and Section 3.2.
4 Composition Methodology
The previous section showed two building blocks, Uni-
form Epidemic and Distributed Ping, and also introduced
the Template composition. This section describes the over-
all protocol design methodology. The methodology pro-
vides the designer with a collection of (a) building blocks
- eight categories of probabilistic/proactive protocols and
strategies with well-studied liveness, scalability and relia-
bility properties - and (b) several composition techniques
that generate protocols with richer semantics, by preserving
scale, reliability and liveness properties of the components.
Figure 2 shows the blocks and compositions. Compositions
can also be applied repeatedly to form hierarchies of proto-
cols. A demonstration of this based on the SWIM example
is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 2. Protocol building blocks and some possible proto-
col compositions to generate [5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
As noted earlier, this methodology was derived from a
retrospective look at the probabilistic protocols [5, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12]. These protocols offer a probabilistic notion of relia-
bility. Decentralization, randomization and message redun-
dancy are used to achieve scale and fault-tolerance. “Scale”
means that the overhead on participating members required
in order to achieve a given level of probabilistic reliabil-
ity grows very slowly with the total number of members.
The dependence varies from being a polylogarithmic func-
tion of, to being independent of the group size. “Fault-
tolerance” means that the reliability offered by the proto-
col is not drastically affected by continuous perturbation
and failure of members, and point to point message deliv-
ery losses. Instead, the reliability degrades gracefully as the
rates of these failures are increased. Some example proto-
cols include Leader Election, Virtually Synchronous Multi-
cast, Data Aggregation, Resource Location and Discovery
(DHT), Group Membership, etc. The reader is referred to
the above publications for more information.
4.1 Protocol Building Blocks
Figure 2 shows the main building block types; Sec-
tions 3.1-3.2 covered two of them. We describe the remain-
der briefly and informally below. These building blocks
generate a superset of the protocols in [5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
• Weak Overlay: A weak overlay is a scheme that each
member uses to select its (partial) membership lists. In ef-
fect, a weak overlay scheme specifies a set of rules that im-
poses an overlay graph among the members present in the
group. Examples include the Leaf Box Hierarchy [11], and
peer to peer overlays Pastry and Chord.
• Topology Awareness Strategies: A topology awareness
scheme imbibes knowledge of round-trip time estimates or
network locations (exact or approximate). It is typically
used in composition with another building block, e.g., with
the Leaf Box Hierarchy (as in [11]), or Uniform Epidemic
(as in [18]).
• Tree Dissemination: A multicast spanning tree is con-
structed among the nodes in a dynamic and distributed fash-
ion [11]. A consistent map function is used; examples in-
clude the Contiguous Mapping [11], and SHA-1.
• K-committee selection: This protocol selects and main-
tains a subgroup of members, that, w.h.p. (a) has a size
within a constant factor of parameter K , and (b) has the
view subgraph connected. An example is [12].
• Recovery: Recovery protocols buffer information (e.g.,
recent multicasts) and supply them to requesting members
that have missed the information. An example is the recov-
ery block used to implement reliable multicast and mem-
bership (virtual synchrony) in [9].
• Reactive: The above building blocks were all either
proactive protocols or a type of strategy for use in proactive
protocols. We also include reactive protocols as a specific
building block. Reactive protocols can be used to update
state in the network, recover from failure or provide demand
driven behavior. An example is the route request protocol
used in AODV [22] which builds routing state only when a
route is needed.
4.2 Composition Techniques
A pair of probabilistic protocols can be composed us-
ing one of the following composition techniques. These are
not formally defined, but are presented as design guidelines.
The guidelines also hint at which pairs of protocols can be
composed. In a later section (6) we will give one formal
interpretation of the guidelines and show how it can be used
to automate protocol generation.
• Template Composition: A “template” for a protocol can
be generated from a problem specification (e.g., the group
membership template in Figure 1) or from the informal
specifications of two protocols one wishes to combine to
achieve a protocol with collective properties. A template
will typically specify the minimal interface/function calls
to be exported by each component. When appropriate pro-
tocols are plugged into the template (followed by necessary
optimizations), the final protocol is generated. An exam-
ple w.r.t. the group membership protocol was discussed in
SWIM
EpidemicPing
 Distributed
Topo−SWIM
 Topology 
Awareness
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Figure 3. Example use of composition techniques and build-
ing blocks to design different membership protocols.
Section 3.
• Augmentation (Either Fashioning or Constraining):
A base composition C1 could be augmented with another
composition C2 to derive a modified protocol that solves
the same problem specification as C1. Yet, the composition
imparts to the (augmented)C1 certain additional properties.
There are two types of augmentation - fashioning and
constraining. For example, a Uniform Epidemic protocol
can be augmented with a component that selects epidemic
targets from a membership list according to (a) a probabil-
ity distribution function, e.g., weighting selections based on
round-trip-time estimates (fashioning) or (b) a set of con-
straints, e.g., eliminating certain types of members from
ever being selected as targets (constraining).
For this example, constraining can indeed be seen as a
special case of fashioning where certain members are as-
signed a round trip time of infinity to prevent them from
being selected as targets. The distinction is made from a
designer’s point of view.
• Pairing: A proactive protocol can be paired with a re-
active protocol to extend the former’s behavior. For each
period of the proactive protocol the reactive protocol is ini-
tiated. The resulting protocol C ′ has both the properties of
C1 and C2 since the two protocols are running side by side.
Optimizations can be made by piggybacking reactive mes-
sages (when available) on periodic proactive messages.
5 Inheriting Protocol Properties
We discuss our observations about the preservation of
protocol properties under (and in spite of) composition.
This discussion applies only to the compositions we have
studied or mentioned in this paper, although general ap-
plicability is a possibility1. We differentiate between the
correctness and analytical properties of protocol building
blocks. Correctness properties include liveness properties
1A discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper.
such as eventual guarantees, e.g., those regarding detection
of failures or eventual dissemination of a multicast when the
view graph is connected. Analytical properties include per-
formance metrics such as latency, probabilistic reliability,
and per member message overhead.
Property Preservation via Composition - Correctness
Properties When two building blocks are combined using
the template, pairing or the augmentation techniques, cor-
rectness properties are inherited by the composition.
Property Preservation via Composition - Analytical
Properties When two building blocks are combined using
the template or pairing technique, analytical properties are
inherited by the composition.
The template technique fits two components into a pro-
tocol framework (template). Similarly the pairing technique
combines a proactive and a reactive protocol to execute si-
multaneously. In both cases the resultant composition can
then be optimized to reduce message complexity etc. (e.g.,
the SWIM protocol). However, the use of the protocol tem-
plate or pairing implies that the resultant composition is
equivalent to the constituent protocols running side-by-side
in the system. As such, their original properties (both cor-
rectness and analytical) are carried over to the composition.
For example, the SWIM membership protocol inherits the
properties from the Distributed Ping protocol that failures
are detected eventually and within an average of 11−e−1 pro-
tocol periods.
Augmentation does not affect the inheritance of correct-
ness properties of a component C1 as long as the com-
posed protocol satisfies the set of preconditions specified
in the original correctness property. For example, a correct-
ness property for a uniform epidemic-based reliable mul-
ticast component says “a multicast is eventually dissemi-
nated to all members in a group if the view graph in the
group stays connected”. An augmentation of the uniform
epidemic with a topology aware component (e.g., where a
probability distribution based on round trip time estimates
is used for gossip target selection) also satisfies the above
correctness property as long as the probability distribution
function keeps the view graph connected.
Although the analytical properties of an augmented com-
position may be different from those of its components, we
observe that the scale and reliability properties are similar to
those of the components, in the sense that per-member over-
heads that vary polylogarithmically with group size suffice
to achieve very high probabilistic reliability. An example is
the augmented epidemic protocol discussed in Section 4.2.
6 Methodology Implementation
We now describe how a simple and clean high-level lan-
guage called PPCL (Proactive Protocol Composition Lan-
guage) that can be used to realize the above described
methodology. PPCL allows a designer to use existing C
source code (for the components) in order to automatically
generate code for new protocols. PPCL is in effect only
used to specify components and compositions. We have im-
plemented a compiler that takes as input source code for the
individual components and a PPCL specification, and out-
puts code for the new protocol. Filler code is generated by
the compiler itself.
6.1 Model
In order to specifically implement an otherwise informal
methodology, we need to make a few assumptions about the
structure of the source code. First, for proactive protocols,
we assume that there exists a primary function that runs the
protocol in a loop. For reactive protocols, we need an ac-
cess point that can be used to hook it into other proactive
protocols. We expand on these details where required.
6.2 PPCL
Although the Proactive Protocol Composition Language
is simple, it is not a toy language. PPCL is powerful enough
to completely specify a protocol based on the methodology
outlined in this paper. The grammar of the language is in
Figure 4. The following are some of the key features:
• familiar and easy to understand syntax
• supports components as base types
• supports compositions as base types
• constructs for integrating user specified filler code
Describing a protocol using PPCL can be done quickly.
First the designer specifies the basic building blocks needed
in the design. This is done with the component type. Next
the designer specifies the compositions to be performed on
the components. There is a keyword and type for each of the
supported compositions. Finally the specification is given
to the compiler which parses the specification and executes
the compositions. It is important to note that the specifi-
cation can be written at any time during the development
process, before, during or after the source code has been
implemented. An example PPCL file which was used in
our later experiments is shown in Figure 5.
In the next sections we briefly discuss the implementa-
tion details of PPCL.
6.2.1 Components
Components are base types in PPCL. A component is spec-
ified by the source file where it is implemented and the
function or set of functions that represent the component.
We allow components to be specified by a set of functions
because components may have different behavior in differ-
ent compositions. For example the template composition
primary_stmt :=
: component_decl | combine_decl | convert_decl
| prepare_decl | template_decl | augment_decl
| pair_decl
component_decl :=
: "component" ’{’ comp_stmt_list ’;’ ’}’ ID
combine_decl :=
: "combine" ’{’ comp_stmt_list ’;’ ’}’ ID
combine_decl :=
: "convert" ’{’ comp_stmt_list ’;’ ’}’ ID
prepare_decl :=
: "prepare" ’{’ comp_stmt_list ’;’ ’}’ ID
comp_stmt_list :=
: comp_stmt_list ’;’ comp_stmt | comp_stmt
comp_stmt :=
: "filename" ’=’ ID ’;’ | "function" ’=’ FUN
template_decl :=
: "template" ’{’ temp_stmt_list ’;’ ’}’ ID
temp_stmt :=
: "component" ’=’ ID ’;’ | match_stmt ’;’
match_stmt :=
: "match" ’(’ FUN ’,’ FUN ’,’ FUN ’)’
| "match" ’(’ FUN ’,’ FUN ’,’ FUN ’,’ ID ’)’
augment_decl :=
: "augment" ’{’ aug_stmt_list ’;’ ’}’ ID
aug_stmt :=
: "component" ’=’ ID ’;’ | replace_stmt ’;’
replace_stmt :=
: "replace" ’(’ FUN ’,’ FUN ’)’
| "replace" ’(’ FUN ’,’ FUN ’,’ ID ’)’
pair_decl :=
: "pair" ’{’ pair_stmt_list ’;’ ’}’ ID
pair_stmt :=
: "component" ’=’ ID | "prep" ’=’ ID
Figure 4. The core PPCL grammar. Repetitive and obvious
rules were cut out for brevity.
merges the components’ periodic functions. An augmen-
tation however may be done in helper functions which are
called from the periodic loop.
6.2.2 Compositions
For each composition in the methodology there is an associ-
ated keyword. Each keyword corresponds to a unique type
in the language which defines the attributes particular to the
composition. Names are given to each composition object
which represent the newly generated component and can be
used in later compositions within the same PPCL file.
• Template The template composition involves merging
two components into a single component. We achieve this
by merging the two periodic functions of each component.
Often the two component loops share some similar function
calls, for example a network send or target member selec-
tion. These duplicated calls can be merged into a single call
in the final component, reducing overhead and simplifying
the code. We use this idea to define the notion of “merge
points”. Merge points are the function calls that are shared
component {
file = dping.cpp;
function = void FailDet();
} dping;
component { ...
} epidemic;
component { ...
} topology-aware;
combine {
file = helper.cpp;
function = void combine_wait_args(...);
} combine-wait;
template {
component = dping;
component = epidemic;
match(
void wait_for_msg(...),
void wait_for_msg(...),
void wait_for_msg(...),
combine-wait
);
match(memList, member_list, memList);
match(recvmsg, recvbuff, recvmsg);
} swim;
augment {
component = swim;
replace(int next_index(), topology-aware);
} topo-swim;
Figure 5. A PPCL file for the SWIM template composition
and an augmentation of SWIM using topology awareness (topo-
SWIM). This example shows the components dping, epidemic, and
topology-aware. Included in the template specification is the merge
point wait for msg which uses the combine-wait combine
type to complete the filler code. The template also has shared vari-
ables for the member list and message buffer.
between the two functions. The merge points are specified
in PPCL with the match statement. Each function is delim-
ited into blocks based on the merge points. These blocks are
then combined around the merged function calls to generate
the final result. An illustration is given in Figure 6.
A difficulty arises in the situation that the two merge
points have different function signatures. Some arbitra-
tion must be done to determine which arguments from the
original function calls are passed to the final function call.
This filler code must be supplied by the user. The PPCL
combine type provides a means by which a designer can
specify this filler code in PPCL. An implementation of the
combine function accepts the parameters from the origi-
nal function calls and generates parameters for the new call.
• Augment The augment composition replaces some be-
havior in a component with new behavior from another
component. Each augment type contains the name of
one target component and any number of replace state-
ments. A replace statement gives the name of the func-
tion call to replace and the name of the replacement compo-
nent. The PPCL compiler decides where to execute the aug-
A−block1
    while (true) {
        merged_call();
        merged_call();
    }
    A−decl block;
    B−decl block;
        A−block1;
        B−block1;
        B−block2;
    A−block2
}
        merge_point();
void function_A() {
    declarations;
void function_B() {
    declarations;
    for (;;) {    while (true) {
        statements;
        statements;
        merge_point();
    }
}
    statements;
        statements;
        statements;
        merge_point();
}
    }
A−decl block
A−block2
B−block3
B−block2
B−decl block
B−block1
void function_merged() {
Figure 6. An illustration of the template merge process.
function A and function B are broken into blocks (top two
diagrams) based on the merge points (merge point) which were
defined in the template specification. The corresponding blocks
from each function are interleaved with merge points in the final
composition (bottom).
mentations based on the original component specifications.
In each function listed in the target component the func-
tion call in the replace statement will be replaced with
a call to the first function listed in the replacement compo-
nent. Filler code to convert the parameters of the original
call into parameters for the new call can be specified with
the convert type.
• Pairing The pairing composition joins a proactive and a
reactive protocol. The reactive protocol is grafted into the
proactive protocol via a specified “access point”. The com-
piler uses the function declared in the reactive component.
The function is called once for every execution of the proac-
tive periodic loop. The prepare type allows a designer to
specify a function that gathers the arguments pass to the ac-
cess point.
7 Additional New Compositions covered by
the Methodology
Figure 2 showed probabilistic protocols that are gener-
ated by our described methodology. In this section we sum-
marize additional protocols for wireless ad-hoc/sensor net-
works that are well-known and can be retroactively gener-
ated by the same methodology. Pseudocode can be found in
the appendix.
Directed Diffusion Directed Diffusion is a routing proto-
col for sensor networks [17]. In diffusion nodes periodi-
cally advertise interest for certain data. Sensors that match
the interest respond with the data. Nodes react to incom-
ing data flow by “reinforcing” certain favorable routes. Di-
rected Diffusion demonstrates the pairing composition. The
two components of directed diffusion are (i) a dissemination
piece which spreads the interest and (ii) a reactive protocol
which responds with reinforcement information. An opti-
mization of the pairing composition is to piggyback rein-
forcement messages on interest packets.
AODV with Gossiping AODV [22] is a reactive protocol
for routing in ad-hoc networks which itself is a composition
of a dissemination and failure detection block. AODV uses
a broadcast dissemination component to send route request
(RREQ) messages. A failure detection protocol discovers
when an existing route breaks. In [13] AODV is augmented
with a gossip based dissemination protocol. The augmented
AODV reduces end-to-end delay and improves packet de-
livery ratio without increasing route length.
SHARP SHARP is a protocol created with the pairing com-
position [23]. SHARP is a pairing of AODV and a proactive
Zone Routing-like Protocol [14]. The proactive protocol is
a composition of a dissemination protocol (builds the zone),
a failure detection protocol (detects and notifies of broken
links) and a recovery protocol (rebuilds routes).
8 Implementation Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally study the PPCL and
the methodology. We choose the problem of maintaining
weakly consistent membership in a distributed group [5].
Specifically, we wish to study the following hypothesis.
A. Generated protocols function like hand-written proto-
cols.
B. Properties of components truly are preserved.
C. The PPCL compiler does not add extra complexity to
existing code.
We first use PPCL to generate a SWIM-like member-
ship protocol from individual components, and then com-
pare its performance with the original SWIM protocol of
[5]. We created two stand-alone components for Uniform
Epidemic and Distributed Ping. The implemented compo-
nents are consistent with our assumptions: each protocol
has a periodic program loop that executes the protocol.
Secondly, we make the above generated SWIM to be
topologically aware. This is achieved by augmenting the
above code (through PPCL) with a topology aware selection
scheme. The scheme selects a node with the probability dis-
tribution function 1d2 where d is the distance to the remote
node. The PPCL file used is in Figure 5.
Thirdly, we calculate several code complexity metrics on
the generated code.
The generated protocols were evaluated in a simulated
environment running in Windows XP on a Pentium 4 3GHz
machine with 1GB RAM. Topologies from GT-ITM [4]
were used to arrange the nodes. For the experiments in Fig-
ures 7,8 the same topology was used for all runs. This topol-
ogy had 4 transit domains with 4 stub domains each. The
stub domains had average 8 nodes with .5 edge probability.
The experiments of Figure 10 were done on two different
topologies each of 135 nodes, 3 transit domains, 5 nodes
per domain, 3 stubs per transit and 3 nodes per stub. All
edge probabilities were .5.
A. We study the behavior of the generated SWIM, and ex-
plain why it is equivalent to that of the original SWIM pro-
tocol. We measured the times failures were first detected,
update dissemination time, and resilience to dropped mes-
sages. The protocol was run for a fixed number of rounds
on varying sizes of groups. At a certain round one member
was killed. All other nodes remained active for the duration
of the run. For each group size we ran two different trials on
different topologies. The minimum detection time amongst
all group members was taken and is shown in Figure 7. The
detection times do not vary with system size, which matches
with the original SWIM protocol.
The same experiments were used to measure rate of up-
date dissemination. Figure 8 shows the results found by
averaging the detection time of each node in the group. The
points show individual detections and the plot shows the
average. We observe a slow and sublinear growth, which
is also consistent with the observations about the original
SWIM system.
Finally, we measure the false positive rate (false fail-
ure detections of non-faulty group members). Members
were allowed to join sequentially, while each message was
dropped with some probability f . The experiment was done
with and without an optimization called the suspicion mech-
anism (which is used to reduce the rate of false positives by
increasing the detection time) - this mechanism was present
in the Distributed Ping component and hence inherited. Fig-
ure 9 shows the results for a value of f = .20. We observe
that the generated protocol can be used to tolerate as much
as 20% loss rate, when used in conjunction with the suspi-
cion mechanism.
B. A new protocol, topo-SWIM was also created using
PPCL. topo-SWIM is an augmentation of the basic SWIM
protocol that uses a topology scheme to select target mem-
bers. To study the effectiveness of topo-SWIM we counted
the number of messages to pass through each router in the
system. We ran the same experiment as for failure detection
for 100 nodes but added 10% packet loss. We ran the ex-
periment on two different topologies. The results for both
topologies are included in Figure 10 with routers 0-14 from
the first topology and 15-29 from the second. Some routers
received no packets in either topo-SWIM or basic SWIM (0
height bars in the figure). We compared the message count
at each router under topo-SWIM with the count under basic
SWIM. Across all routers, topo-SWIM sent 95.3% the num-
ber of messages sent by basic SWIM. Loads are reduced by
up to as much as 14% on some individual routers. The small
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Figure 8. Failure update dissemination time. Detection time
at individual nodes is compared to the time of first detection.
savings are due to the short diameter of the underlying net-
work; with a larger number of stubs and transits, the router
load savings would have been higher.
C. After running the simulations we also analyzed the com-
plexity of the source code. This was important to show that
the code generated by PPCL is understandable and usable
by a human reader. We chose two of the more commonly
used static metrics for code complexity: cyclomatic com-
plexity [21] which measures a code’s stability and Halstead
volume [15] which measures lexical complexity. The metric
values for each of the described components are in Table 1.
Ideally the complexity of composed protocols would be no
more than the sum of the components’ complexities.
Under template composition the complexity increased
slightly. This slight increase is expected due to the code
changes affected by the template composition, and is ac-
ceptably small. Augmentation adds little to no complexity
which is also expected since it does not involve major code
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maximum group size (i.e., no false detections). Without suspicion,
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changes.
Overall these results show that the code complexity of
the generated protocols is not considerably worse than the
original component implementations.
9 Conclusion
We have described a simple and clean methodology con-
sisting of building blocks (protocols or strategies) and com-
position rules. The methodology is powerful enough to
generate a class of protocols for large-scale Internet-based
process groups [5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] , as well as for wire-
less ad-hoc/sensor networks (Section 7). We have then pre-
sented a high level language called PPCL that instantiates
this methodology. PPCL can be used to specify existing
Module Cyclomatic Halstead LOC
Gossip 151 67687 540
D-Ping 93 8306 473
Topo 6 1854 32
SWIM composed 249 79902 956
Topo-SWIM 249 79941 956
Table 1. Software complexity metric values. From left to
right, cyclomatic complexity, Halstead volume, and lines of code.
source code as components, and allows a designer to auto-
matically generate code for composed protocols. We have
argued how the methodology and PPCL are retroactive (i.e.,
generate already existing protocols), and progressive (i.e.,
generate new protocols). Our experiments show that gener-
ated protocols have similar behavior to corresponding hand-
designed protocol, and that compositions preserve scalabil-
ity and reliability of the components.
Future Work: PPCL could be extended to support prop-
erty inferring. For each component, its properties would be
specified in PPCL. Using the given properties the compiler
would reason about the properties of the generated protocol.
References
[1] J. Ambrosio. Tools for the code generation. Ap-
plication Development Trends Magazine, 2003.
http://www.adtmag.com/article.asp?id=7850.
[2] N. T. Bailey. The Mathematical Theory of Infectious Dis-
eases and its Applications. Hafner Press, 2 edition, 1975.
[3] K. P. Birman, M. Hayden, O. Ozkasap, Z. Xiao, M. Budiu,
and Y. Minsky. Bimodal multicast. ACM Tr. Comp. Sys.,
17(2):41–88, May 1999.
[4] K. Calvert, M. Doar, and E. W. Zegura. Modeling inter-
net topology. IEEE Comm. Magazine, 35(6):160–163, June
1997.
[5] A. Das, I. Gupta, and A. Motivala. Swim: Scalable weakly-
consistent infection-style process group membership proto-
col. In Proc. 2002 DSN, pages 303–312, June 2002.
[6] A. Demers, D. Greene, C. Hauser, W. Irish, J. Larson,
S. Shenkcr, H. Sturgis, D. Swinehart, and D. Terry. Epi-
demic algorithms for replicated database maintenance. In
Proc. 6th ACM PODC, pages 1–12, 1987.
[7] E. Gamma, R. Helm, R. Johnson, and J. Vlissides. Design
Patterns. Addison-Wesley, 1st edition, 1995.
[8] I. Gupta, K. Birman, P. Linga, A. Demers, and R. van Re-
nesse. Kelips: Building an efficient and stable P2P DHT
through increased memory and background overhead. In
Proc. 2nd IPTPS, 2003.
[9] I. Gupta, K. P. Birman, and R. van Renesse. Fighting
fire with fire: Using randomized gossip to combat stochas-
tic scalability limits. Journ. Quality and Reliability Engg.
Intnl., 18(3):165–184, May/June 2002.
[10] I. Gupta, T. D. Chandra, and G. S. Goldszmidt. On scalable
and efficient distributed failure detectors. In Proc. 20th ACM
PODC, pages 170–179, 2001.
[11] I. Gupta, A.-M. Kermarrec, and A. J. Ganesh. Efficient
epidemic-style protocols for reliable and scalable multicast.
In Proc. 21st SRDS, page 180, 2002.
[12] I. Gupta, R. van Renesse, and K. Birman. A probabilisit-
ically correct leader election protocol for large groups. In
Proc. 14th DISC, LNCS-1914, pages 89–103, 2000.
[13] Z. J. Haas, J. Y. Halpern, and E. L. Li. Gossip based ad-hoc
routing. In Proc. IEEE Infocom, June 2002.
[14] Z. J. Haas and M. R. Pearlman. The performance of query
control schemes for the zone routing protocol. SIGCOMM
Comp. Comm. Rev., 28(4):167–177, 1998.
[15] M. H. Halstead. Elements of Software Science (Operating
and Programming Systems Series). Elsevier, 1977.
[16] N. C. Hutchinson and L. L. Peterson. The x-kernel: An
architecture for implementing network protocols. In IEEE
Trans. Softw. Eng., volume 17, pages 64–76, 1991.
[17] C. Intanagonwiwat, R. Govindan, and D. Estrin. Directed
diffusion: a scalable and robust communication paradigm
for sensor networks. In Mobile Computing and Networking,
pages 56–67, 2000.
[18] D. Kempe, J. M. Kleinberg, and A. J. Demers. Spatial gossip
and resource location protocols. In Proc. ACM STOC, pages
163–172, 2001.
[19] X. Liu, C. Kreitz, R. van Renesse, J. Hickey, M. Hay-
den, K. Birman, and R. Constable. Building reliable, high-
performance communication systems from components. In
Proc. 17th ACM SOSP, volume 33, pages 80–92, 1999.
[20] N. A. Lynch. Distributed Algorithms. Morgan Kaufman,
1997.
[21] T. J. McCabe and C. W. Butler. Design complexity measure-
ment and testing. Comm. ACM, 32(12):1415–1425, Decem-
ber 1989.
[22] C. E. Perkins and E. M. Royer. Ad-hoc on-demand distance
vector routing. In Proc. of the 2nd IEEE Wksp. on Mobile
Comp. Sys. and Apps, pages 90–100. IEEE, February 1999.
[23] V. Ramasubramanian, Z. J. Haas, and E. G. Sirer. Sharp: a
hybrid adaptive routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks.
In Proc. of the 4th ACM MobiHoc Conference, pages 303–
314, June 2003.
[24] A. Reid, M. Flatt, L. Stoller, J. Lepreau, and E. Eide. Knit:
Component composition for systems software. In Proc. 4th
OSDI, 2000.
[25] J.-G. Schneider and O. Nierstrasz. Scripting: Higher-level
programming for component based systems. In Tutorial,
OOPSLA, 1998.
[26] R. van Renesse, K. P. Birman, and S. Maffeis. Horus: A flex-
ible group communication system. Comm. ACM, 39(4):76–
83, April 1996.
[27] G. T. Wong, M. A. Hiltunen, and R. D. Schlichting. A con-
figurable and extensible transport protocol. In Proc. IEEE
Infocom, pages 319–328, 2001.
[28] S.-H. Wu, S. A. Smolka, and E. W. Stark. Composition and
behaviors of probabilistic I/O automata. Theor. Comp. Sci.,
176(1-2):1–38, April 1997.
A Pseudocode Examples
T : protocol period.
DIRECTED-DIFFUSION
while (interested)
msg← new data interest
DISSEMINATE(msg)
WAIT(T )
repeat
Figure 11. Pseduocode for Directed Diffusion interest prop-
agation.
DD-RECV-DATA(data)
if IS-HIGH-QUALITY(data.src)
then
pend− rf ← new reinforcement(data.src)
SEND pend− rf
endif
Figure 12. Pseduocode for Directed Diffusion reinforcement
component.
T : protocol period.
DIRECTED-DIFFUSION-PAIRED while (true)
msg← new data interest
if pend− rf != null
then
msg← PIGGYBACK(msg, pend− rf )
pend− rf ← null
endif
DISSEMINATE(msg)
WAIT(T )
repeat
Figure 13. Pseduocode for main loop of Paired interest
propagation and reinforcement components from Directed Dif-
fusion.
AODV-REQUEST-ROUTE(dst)
route← rtable[dst]
if route == null
then
msg ← RREQ(dst)
FLOOD (msg)
endif
AODV-NODE-FAILURE(node)
foreach route r that contains node
do
msg ← RERR(r)
FLOOD (msg)
done
Figure 14. Pseudocode for AODV route request and failure
notification.
/* Ms: the current member. */
/* N : estimate of group size */
/* b: gossip fanout */
/* V iewMs : Membership List at member Ms */
UNIFORM-EPIDEMIC(multi− cast−msg)
for logN gossip rounds
for i← 1 to b
Mtarget ← SELECT-RANDOM-NODE(V iewMs)
UNICAST(Mtarget,multi− cast−msg)
Figure 15. Pseudocode for uniform epidemic.
AODV-REQUEST-ROUTE(dst)
route← rtable[dst]
if route == null
then
msg ← RREQ(dst)
UNIFORM-EPIDEMIC(msg)
endif
AODV-NODE-FAILURE(node)
foreach route r that contains node
do
msg ← RERR(r)
UNIFORM-EPIDEMIC(msg)
done
Figure 16. AODV augmented with uniform epidemic.
ZONE-CONSTRUCTION
while (true)
msg ← DAG− construction(self)
FLOOD(msg)
WAIT(reconstruct− interval)
ZRP-RECV-DATA(msg, dst)
nexthop← routes[dst]
if nexthop! = null
then
UNICAST(nesthop, msg, dst)
else
FLOOD(msg)
endif
ZRP-RECV-CONST(target, src)
routes[target] = src
Figure 17. A Zone Routing Protocl-like algorithm.
SHARP-ZONE-CONSTRUCTION
while (true)
msg ← DAG− construction(self)
FLOOD(msg)
WAIT(reconstruct− interval)
SHARP-RECV-DATA(msg, dst)
if dst == myaddr
then
DELIVER(msg)
else
nexthop← routes[dst]
if nexthop! = null
then
UNICAST(nexthop, msg, dst)
else
AODV-FWD(msg, dst)
endif
endif
SHARP-RECV-CONST(msg, src)
routes[msg.target] = src
if −−msg.ttl > 0
then
FLOOD(msg)
endif
Figure 18. SHARP protocol which is a pairing of a Zone
Routing Protocl-like algorithm and AODV.
